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DAMES & MOORE v. REGAN: THE IRANIAN
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, SUPREME
COURT ACQUIESCENCE TO
BROAD PRESIDENTIAL
DISCRETION
On November 4, 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran was
seized, and approximately fifty Americans were taken hostage. As a result
of that crisis, President Jimmy Carter declared a national emergency and
prohibited the removal or transfer of all Iranian property within the jurisdiction of United States courts.' In addition, the President delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations
necessary to enforce the blocking order.2
After nearly fifteen months of captivity, the Americans returned home.
In exchange for their release, Iran exacted several obligations from the
United States government which were embodied in two declarations by
the Republic of Algeria.' In a statement of general principles, the United
States and Iran agreed that all United States legal proceedings against Iran
would be terminated, all attachments and judgments obtained would be
nullified, and all future litigation against Iran would be prohibited.4 The
agreements also established an international arbitral tribunal, called the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, to bring about the termination of all
claims through binding arbitration. 5 The Agreements were implemented
1. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,279 (1979).
2. Id The Treasury Department issued a regulation that provided, in part: "[U]nless
licensed or authorized ... any attachment, judgment, decree, lien, execution, garnishment,
or other judicial process is null and void with respect to any property in which on or since
[November 14, 1979] there existed an interest of Iran." 31 C.F.R. § 535.203(e) (1981). These
regulations also provided that any licenses or authorizations granted could be "amended,
modified, or revoked at any time." 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1981).
3.

81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1-4 (Feb. 1981). The two agreements are: Declarationofthe

Government of the DemocraticandPopularRepublic ofAlgeria [hereinafter cited as Declaration I], and Declarationof the Government of the Democraticand PopularRepublic fAlgeria
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Islamic Republic ofIran [hereinafter cited as DeclarationII]. [Reference to Declaration I and Declaration 11 together will be hereinafter referred to as the
Agreements.].
4. DeclarationI, supra note 3, at 2.
5. Declaration II, supra note 3, at 3. The Tribunal is composed of nine members.
Three members are from the United States, three from Iran, and the remaining three chosen
by these six members. It has jurisdiction to hear all claims against both the United States
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in the United States by a series of executive orders issued by President
Carter 6 and one executive order issued by President Reagan.7
Each executive order set forth the authorization for the presidential actions taken in implementing the Agreements.' Presidents Reagan and
Carter purported to act pursuant to the authority granted by the Constitution and several acts of Congress, most notably the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).9
and Iran outstanding at the time of the agreement, as well as official claims against the
United States and Iran by each other. The Tribunal is also empowered to interpret the
terms of the Agreements. Id
Some discussion has centered on the benefit, or lack thereof, of submitting pending
United States claims to the tribunal. The most comprehensive discussion of this matter
appeared in Chas. T. Main Int'l v. Khuzestan Water & Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (lst. Cir
1981).
The Main court saw three disadvantages from the claimant's perspective. First, because
the panel was composed partly of Iranians, it might be less sympathetic toward United
States claims than might a United States district court. Second, the tribunal could become
stalled in procedural snarls. 651 F.2d at 815. Finally, Congress recognized that although the
aggregate dollar value of all claims could be beyond comprehension at the time, it was
believed that the amount far exceeds the funds held in escrow for payment of these claims.
There was no assurance that Iran would honor its commitment to transfer additional funds
to satisfy any inadequacy. See The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
ForeignRelations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1981) [hereinafter cited as the Iran Agreements].
The Main court pointed out several advantages as well. Claimants could derive some
protection from the $1 billion escrow account established for payment of the claims and
funded by Iran. 651 F.2d at 815. The lack of assurance that the account would be adequately funded, however, undercuts this contention. A tribunal award might be more valuable abroad, however, because the parties agreed that any award would be enforceable
against them in the courts of any country. Id Nevertheless, this contention assumes the
absence of prejudgment attachments of Iranian property in the United States. In both Main
and Dames & Moore v. Regan, No. CV 81-2064 LEW (Px) (C.D. Cal. May 28,1981) (available in Appendix, Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Davis & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972
(1981)), this was not the case.
Lastly, the Main court asserted that Iran would be unable to present sovereign immunity
and act-of-state defenses thus avoiding lengthy pretrial skirmishes. Congress has, however,
outlined procedures to circumvent these frustration of suit defenses. See infra notes 96-108
and accompanying text.
6. Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-85, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-31 (1981) (President Carter sought to
implement all of the obligations embodied in the Agreements that became binding prior to
the end of his term).
7. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981) (President Reagan suspended
pending claims and provided for their arbitration in the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal).
8. An executive agreement, like a treaty, is an agreement between two nations. In the
United States, such agreements are distinquished from treaties because the President enters
into them without the advice and consent of the Senate. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (1972). Whether negotiations are concluded by an executive
agreement or a treaty has little relevance as a matter of international law. See 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (1970).
9. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06 (Supp. 11 1978) [hereinafter cited as IEEPA]. The executive
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Several lawsuits quickly followed the issuance of the executive orders.
In one suit, Dames & Moore, on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Dames & Moore International, filed a claim against the Government of
Iran and others in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California. Dames & Moore contended that it was owed nearly $3.5
million under a contract for services with the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran. Initially, the district court issued prejudgment attachment orders
to secure a judgment against the defendant.' ° Thereafter, the court
awarded Dames & Moore the amount claimed under the contract. Following the issuance of the executive orders implementing the Iranian settlement agreements, however, the district court rescinded the prejudgment
attachments."
Dames & Moore filed suit against the United States and the Secretary of
the Treasury seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the executive orders. The suit was dismissed by the district court
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.' 2 Because
of the pressing time restraints incorporated into the Iranian settlement
before judgment and set
agreement, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
3
an expedited briefing and argument schedule.'
The Supreme Court, in Dames & Moore v. Regan,'14 addressed two sigorders also cited 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1976), 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), and 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (1976)
as further authority for the various executive actions. Only the IEEPA and 22 U.S.C. § 1732
directly relate to the issues addressed by the Supreme Court in Dames & Moore. The executive orders also cited the Constitution as authority for the actions taken. However, no specific constitutional section was mentioned either in the orders or by the parties in Dames &
Moore.
10. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, No. CV 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 18, 1981) (available in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, at A-13, Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 101 S. Ct 2972 (1981)). The President had granted a general license allowing certain
judicial proceedings, including prejudgment attachments, but had disallowed the entry of
any judgment or order of analogous effect. 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.504(a), 535.418 (1980). After a
blocking order has been issued, no judicial proceeding is valid in the absence of a license.
See 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.201, 535.203(a), 535.310, 535.502 (1980).
11. Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Org. of Iran, No. CV 79-04918 LEW (Px) (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 18, 1981).
12. Dames & Moore v. Regan, No. CV 81-2064 LEW (Px)(C.D. Cal. May 28, 1981).
Dames & Moore contended that the executive orders and regulations promulgated thereunder were unconstitutional to the extent that they affected the final judgment it had obtained
against Iran and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, its execution on that judgment,
and its prejudgment attachments of the assets of the Iranian bank defendants, against whom
judgment had not been entered.
13. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 3071 (1981) (order granting expedited briefing
and argument schedule). The Court was forced to move quickly in this matter because
unless there was some government action by July 19, 1981, Iran could consider the United
States to be in breach of the Agreements. 101 S. Ct. at 2981.
14. 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
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nificant questions. The first issue was whether the President had specific
congressional authorization to nullify prejudgment attachments and order
the transfer of Iranian assets. Relying on the IEEPA, the Court held that
the President possessed such authority.' 5 The second issue addressed by
the Court was whether the President had authority to suspend United
States claims pending against Iran in United States courts. Although it
found no specific congressional authorization, the Court held that the actions taken were within the inherent power of the presidency.' 6
This Note will examine the analysis of presidential authority articulated
by the Court in Dames & Moore and discuss its potential impact on private
litigants. It will review the development of presidential authority in foreign affairs through the use of executive agreements, focusing on the broad
scope of the President's substantive power to affect foreign claims settlement. Finally, this Note will demonstrate Dames & Moore's endorsement
of broad presidential discretion in this area.
I.
A.

BASIS FOR PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY

Executive Agreements and Foreign Affairs

The current scope of presidential authority in foreign affairs might best
be characterized as amorphous. Congressional or judicial development of
the law in this area is lacking.' 7 Moreover, the United States Constitution
does not enumerate any comprehensive foreign affairs power scheme.18 In
many ways, current concerns over the separation of powers in foreign affairs embody the same struggles experienced in the earliest years of this
country.' 9 Considering only its affirmative grants of power,2" the Consti15.
16.
17.
18.

Id at 2984.
Id at 2983, 2991.
See L. HENKIN, supra note 8,-at 3-11.
Professor Corwin has observed that the Constitution merely confers general powers

capable of affecting foreign relations on the President, the Senate, and Congress, leaving for
events to resolve which of these organs shall have the decisive and final vote in determining
the course of the nation. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 171 (1957).

This can be frustrating when analyzing presidential power in foreign affairs. As Professor
Henkin adds, "the lawyer is often hard-put to determine even the President's own view as to
the reach of his various resources of constitutional authority. But the constitutional sum of

Presidential power depends on its parts, and, however imprecisely, analysis measures them
singly." L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 45.
19. For example, recurrent disputes have arisen as a result of the President's authority

as commander in chief of the armed forces and congressional authority to declare war. It
has been estimated that on no fewer than 125 occasions, Presidents from Jefferson to Carter
have asserted the right to send troops abroad on their own authority. See BackgroundInformation on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DIVISION, LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FOR THE SUBCOMM.
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tution might be said to invite conflict among the
federal branches for the
2
privilege of directing American foreign policy. '
The increasing interaction among nations, commercially and otherwise,
intensifies the problem of defining the President's foreign affairs power. Of
course, there is wide agreement that the President wields great power in
the conduct of foreign relations.12 Juxtaposed to this executive authority,
Congress enjoys prevailing power to regulate foreign commerce. 23 Commercial interaction among nations necessarily touches upon both of these
spheres. In such areas, Congress and the President are said to have concurrent authority. 24 With commercial interaction among nations increasing, the potential for conflict between these branches also increases.2 5
The Constitution does not explicitly authorize the President to enter into
agreements other than treaties. 26 Nevertheless, Presidents have frequently
used executive agreements for various purposes in effectuating internaON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 & App. I & 11 (1970 Revision). Professor Henkin

adds: "By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have established their
authority to send troops abroad probably beyond effective challenge, at least where Congress is silent, but the constitutional foundations and the constitutional limits of that authority remain in dispute." L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 53.
20. The Constitution expressly confers certain powers on the President and Congress
that necessarily affect the conduct of foreign affairs. For example, the President has express
constitutional authority to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, consuls, and others, in addition to being commander in chief of the armed forces. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Congress
enjoys express authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations, establish uniform rules
of naturalization, define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and maintain the armed forces. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
21. As Professor Corwin has pointed out, the doctrine of concurrent authority of the
President and Congress over foreign affairs and the reluctance of the judiciary to decide
political questions have combined to keep the powers of the federal government in foreign
relations "fluid and easily available." E. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 171-77. However, in
addition, this situation promotes a constant struggle for power. Id at 177.
22. The President's broad foreign affairs power was recognized long ago. In 1799, Representative John Marshall stated before the House of Representatives: "The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations." E. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 177-78.
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. See L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 104-07.
25. Professor Tribe has maintained that "[d]octrines recognizing great presidential
power in the foreign sphere rest on the increasingly dubious separation between foreign and
domestic policy and an increasingly false premise that steps taken abroad have little impact
at home.
... L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-3, at 164 n.2 (1978).
26. 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 21, at 194 (1970). The President's treaty making power can be found at U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It has been
pointed out, however, that the Constitution does provide for "Agreements or Compacts"
between states and foreign powers, with the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10;
see also L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 173-74.
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tional negotiations.27 The utility of an executive agreement, as an instrument manifesting presidential foreign affairs power, fluctuates depending
upon the substantive authority of the President in the area the agreement is
intended to affect. In this way, an executive agreement may create a conflict between Congress and the President. Most of these agreements are
given effect, however, under existing presidential legal or constitutional
authority or through legislation approving or implementing the agreement. 28 It appears settled that when the President acts through an executive agreement pursuant to express congressional authorization, or when
subsequently supported by joint resolution of Congress, the President's
power is coextensive with the treaty power.2 9 Similarly, the President's
power to make "sole" executive agreements, pursuant to express constitutional authorization, but without the benefit of congressional support, has
not been doubted.3 °
Despite, or perhaps because of, the amorphous nature of the executive
power over foreign affairs, there is a dearth of case law on this subject.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has issued a few significant decisions
concerning foreign affairs actions by the executive branch. In 1937, the
Court, in United States v. Belmont,3 expressed its view of the effectiveness
of sole executive agreements. A Russian corporation deposited money
with Belmont, a New York banker, prior to 1918. In 1918, the Soviet government enacted a decree whereby it dissolved the corporation and appropriated all of its property, including the deposit with Belmont. Belmont
refused to relinquish the funds. The deposit remained the property of the
Soviet government until 1933, when it was released and assigned to the
United States government. The executive agreement that gave rise to the
assignment was part of a larger plan to normalize relations between the
Soviet Union and the United States and to bring about the recognition of
the Soviet government by the United States. The Supreme Court held in
favor of the United States, recognizing that its external affairs are to be
exercised without regard to state laws or policies. 3 2 In so holding, the
27. As Professor Henkin has stated, "[w]ithout the consent of the Senate, the approval
of Congress, or the support of a treaty, Presidents from Washington to Nixon have made
many thousands of agreements, of different degrees of formality and importance, on matters
running the gamut of American foreign relations." L. HENKIN, supra note 8, 177.
28. See 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 26, § 20, at 185.
29. Such congressional-executive agreements are the law of the land, superceding inconsistent state or federal laws. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 4-4, at 170; 14 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 26, § 23, at 216-17; L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 174-75.
30. See L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 174-75.
31. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
32. Id at 331. Belmont argued that the appropriation of the deposit by the soviet gov-
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Court observed that the executive agreement was within the authority of
the President.33 The Court took judicial notice of the fact that the assignment was part of a larger plan to recognize the Soviet government.34
The Court was confronted with basically the same issue five years later
in United States v. Pink.35 The Court held that the presidential power to
recognize the Soviet government included the power to remove obstacles
to recognition such as the settlement of claims against American nationals. 36 Relying on Belmont, the Court observed: "A treaty is a 'Law of the
Land' under the supremacy clause. . . of the Constitution. Such international compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar
dignity."37
Belmont and Pink clearly acknowledge the President's power to enter
into executive agreements. These cases, however, have shed little light on
the scope of that power.3" The recognition of a foreign government, a necessary concomitant of sovereignty, is commonly acknowledged to be solely
within the purview of the executive of the recognizing nation.3 9 In the
United States, recognition has been viewed as "an 'enumerated' power implied in the President's express powers to appoint and receive
Ambassadors."'
A more complicated problem is presented when an executive agreement
is not supported by either the Constitution or an act of Congress, but is
entered into pursuant to the President's inherent or plenary power over the
ernment amounted to an act of confiscation and, thus, was contrary to New York state pub-

lic policy.
33. Id
34. Id at 330.
35. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
36. Id at 229.
37. Id. at 230. Although never specifically referred to as the Litvinov Assignment, the
assignment of claims that concerned the court in Belmont was the same assignment as in
Pink. Id at 229.
38. In his dissenting opinion in Pink, Chief Justice Stone pointed out the weakness in
relying on Belmont. He asserted that the Court's proclamations in Belmont, other than those
concerning the narrow holding of that case, were dicta. Id at 243-44. His argument is
fortified by an analysis of Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Belmont which expressly
restricted the holding to the facts of the case:
In so holding, we deal only with the case as now presented and with the parties
now before us. We do not consider the status of adverse claims, if there be any, of
others not parties to this action. . . . We decide only that the complaint alleges
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the respondents.
301 U.S. at 332-33.
39. 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 75, at 243-44 (1906); see also Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
40. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 178.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 31:565

subject matter. 4 Congress has never successfully defined the President's
power in this area, although much legislation has been introduced.4 2
While the Supreme Court has never invalidated an executive agreement
for lack of Senate consent, it has provided little guidance on the President's
power to act alone. 43 The little guidance that does exist was furnished by
Justice Jackson in the landmark case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. 4
B. The Youngstown Analysis of PresidentialAuthority
In late 1951, steel companies and their employees engaged in a labor
dispute concerning the terms and conditions omitted in new collective bargaining agreements. After protracted negotiation, the employees gave notice of an intention to strike. The indispensability of steel as a component
of virtually all war materials led President Truman to issue an executive
order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the steel
mills and keep them operating.4 5
The Supreme Court, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,46 sustained a challenge to the President's authority and the government was
forced to relinquish control of the steel mills.47 Justice Black, writing for
41. Although the Government argued otherwise, the Supreme Court, in Dames d
Moore, found that with regard to the suspension of pending United States claims in United
States courts, the President acted pursuant only to inherent authority. See infra notes 140-55
and accompanying text. See generally E. CORWIN, supra note 18, at 171-77.
42. The Dames & Moore Court was quick to point this out:
In 1972, Congress entertained legislation relating to congressional oversight of such
agreements. But Congress took only limited action, requiring that the text of significant executive agreements be transmitted to Congress. . . . Likewise in this
case, Congress, though legislating in the area, has left 'untouched' the authority of
the President to enter into settlement agreements.
101 S. Ct. at 2988 n. 10. Arguably, a sole executive agreement, unlike a treaty, cannot override a prior act of Congress. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.
1953), af'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955), the Fourth Circuit invalidated an agreement with Canada regarding the importation of potatoes on the ground that the agreement
conflicted with a prior enactment by Congress in an exercise of its power to regulate foreign
commerce. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 4-4, at 171.
43. L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 179. The Supreme Court, in United States v. CurtisWright Export, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), spoke of the President as the "sole organ" of the government in foreign affairs. Critics of that comment point to the Senate's constitutional role
in ratifying treaties and enumerated congressional powers that touch upon international affairs. See, e.g., Comment, Self-executing Executive Agreements.: A Separation of Powers
Problem, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 137 (1975). See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 8, at 45-50;
L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 4-2, at 159-61.
44. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
45. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
46. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
47. Id at 589.
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the Court, recognized that neither an act of Congress nor the Constitution
authorized President Truman's action; 48 thus, the Court invalidated the
seizure order.4 9 More importantly, Justice Jackson's concurring opinion"°
provided the guidelines within which courts have frequently analyzed subsequent presidential actions."'
Justice Jackson divided presidential power into three categories that varied according to the source of the President's authority and the level of
scrutiny applied by a court in analyzing presidential actions varied for
each category. If the President acted pursuant to congressional authorization, his authority was at its maximum.52 If he acted in an area lacking
congressional guidance, he could rely only upon his own independent authority.5 3 If he took measures incompatible with the will of Congress, he
could rely only upon his own constitutional power less Congress' constitutional power, if any, over the matter.5 4
Id at 585.
Id at 589.
Id at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Justice Jackson's opinion has been widely recognized and frequently applied. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 25, § 4-7, at 181-83; Bruff, JudicialReview and the President's Statutory
Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1982).
52. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 635.
53. Id at 637.
54. Because the Supreme Court, in Dames & Moore, analyzed the President's actions in
bringing about the Iranian settlement agreements within this framework, a lengthy text of
Justice Jackson's concurrence is set out below:
[The Constitution] enjoins upon its branches of government separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We
may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in
which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinquishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress,his authorityis at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, he may be said (for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually
means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power ...
2. When the President actsin the absence of either a congressionalgrant or denial
of authority,he can only rely upon his own independentpowers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrentauthority,or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is
likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, hispoweris at its lowest ebbfor then he can rely only upon his own
constitutionalpowers minus any constitutionalpowers of Congress over the matter.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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Justice Jackson thus recognized several considerations regarding the
analysis of presidential powers. First, only when the President acts with
55
congressional authorization does he personify the federal sovereignty.
Second, the ultimate consideration in any analysis should be the maintenance of the separation of powers within the federal government.5 6 Finally, a large measure of power to make national policy is fixed neither in
the President nor Congress, but fluctuates with the initiatives and actions
of each branch. 7
Although Justice Jackson realized that these groupings were oversimplified,58 his opinion has enjoyed frequent use in subsequent analyses of presidential actions. 9 Since Youngstown, however, Congress has sought to
define presidential options more precisely.
C

CongressionalGuidance and the President'sForeignAffairs Power

Congressional response to the exigencies of foreign relations has been
varied.6 ° Congress has provided guidance with regard to the conduct of
Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling
the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.
Id at 635-38 (emphasis supplied; citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id at 655.
57. See The Yale Paper-ndochina."The Constitutional Crisi, reprintedin W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231-34 (5th Ed. 1980).
58. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
59. See Bruff, supra note 51.
60. A complete discussion in this regard is beyond the scope of this note. In Dames &
Moore, the President relied on the IEEPA and 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) as authority for the
actions embodied in the executive orders. In its analysis of the issues presented in the case,
the Court also discussed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602
(1976) [hereinafter referred to as FSIA], and the International Claims Settlement Act, 22
U.S.C. § 1621-1627 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The IEEPA and the FSIA are discussed subsequently in the text. See infra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
In 1868, Congress enacted 22 U.S.C. § 1732, the so called Hostage Act. Following the
Civil War, several countries refused to recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans
and thereby repatriated these United States citizens against their will. In an effort to curtail
their activities, Congress gave the President virtually unlimited power, short of war, to effectuate their release. The Act, however, has virtually no direct applicability in the context of
the Iranian settlement agreements.
In 1949, Congress enacted the International Claims Settlement Act to provide for the
allocation of funds received from an executive claims settlement with Yugoslavia. Through
amendment, this Act has been used in the allocation of funds received from subsequent
claims settlements. Most recently, the Act has been used in the settlement of claims with the
People's Republic of China, 22 U.S.C. § 1627 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), and Vietnam, 22
U.S.C. §§ 1645, 1645a(5) (Supp. IV 1980). The Act does not, however, contain explicit congressional authorization for the President's exercise of exclusive authority in foreign claims
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foreign affairs when practicable. With regard to the Iranian settlement
agreements, congressional guidance takes two forms. First, the IEEPA is
important for the authority it gives the President concerning foreign claims
settlement. Second, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 6 (FSIA) is important because it imposes limitations on the President's authority in this
area.
L

The Evolution of the JEEPA

In 1977, Congress enacted the IEEPA with the intent to redefine the
President's authority over international economic transactions.6 2 Through
usage and amendment, its predecessor, the Trading With the Enemy Act
(TWEA),6 3 conferred on the President unusually broad powers that Congress believed he should not normally possess. 64
Originally enacted in 1917 to "define, regulate, and punish trading with
the enemy,"" the TWEA was limited by its terms to the regulation of foreign economic transactions during wartime. These powers were provided
for and defined in section 5(b) of the Act. Primarily in response to immediate needs, Congress frequently amended the TWEA, offering the President greater latitude than was envisioned by the framers of this
legislation. 66 Thus, section 5(b) essentially became an unlimited grant of
settlement. As a result, it adds little in defining the President's power in this area. See infra
notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602 (1976).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as
IEEPA Report].
63. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter referred to as the TWEA].
64. The history of the use of the TWEA as authority for various presidential actions
supports this view. See IEEPA Report, supra note 62, at 3-6.
65. Id at 3.
66. Prior to the enactment of the IEEPA, the TWEA had been expanded by amendment to give a President authority in times of national emergency similar to that which he
was previously allowed to exercise only in wartime. In addition, several actions alleged
pursuant to the TWEA were wholly domestic in nature. For example, in 1933, President
Roosevelt, citing the TWEA as authority, declared a national emergency and a bank holiday
to prevent the hoarding of gold. Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933). At that time,
section 5(b) was explicitly limited by its terms to wartime use. Congress, however, ratified
the President's actions by amending the TWEA on March 9, 1933, just three days later. See
IEEPA Report, supra note 62, at 3-6. Immediately prior to the enactment of the IEEPA,
section 5(b)(l) of TWEA read, in pertinent part:
During the time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared
by the President, the President may . ...
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privi-
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authority, enabling the President to exercise broad discretionary powers in
67
both domestic and foreign economic areas without congressional review.
Congressional dissatisfaction with the TWEA was convincingly expressed by the House Committee on International Relations in its report
on the IEEPA reform legislation. Quoting from the hearings conducted by
the Committee, the report stated: "[TWEA] is a prime example of the unchecked proliferation of Presidential power for purposes totally unforeseen
by the creators of that power."'68 The report further noted that the Carter
Administration supported the reform of section 5(b). 69 It is clear from the
legislative history that the purpose of the IEEPA was to limit presidential
power to regulate foreign economic transactions in future times of national
emergency.
To achieve this end, the reform legislation distinguished between the
President's authority during wartime and during a national emergency:
his power during wartime remained intact; but, Congress redefined his authority to act during a national emergency. Although the wording of section 5(b) was largely unchanged, the IEEPA included substantive
restrictions and procedural limitations on the President's power.7 ° Moreover, the legislative history distinguished the IEEPA from section 5(b) of
the TWEA. 7" Congress was unwilling to grant to the President the same
lege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any
property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ....
50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (1976).
67. IEEPA Report, supra note 62, at 7.
68. Id at 9.
69. The report stated:
In testimony before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade, the administration admitted the need for changes in section 5(b). Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury C. Fred Bergsten testified as follows:
* * * we recognize that the 60-year history of the section has revealed the desirability of reforms in the way its nonwartime national emergency powers are exercised. Indeed, the authority of the section is so broad that this administration
strongly believes that the powers should only be used on a truly emergency basis.
IEEPA Report, supra note 62, at 9.
70. Inaddition to a general grant of authority, the IEEPA includes five sections outlining procedural limits and providing congressional review of presidential action. 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701, 1703-1706 (1977).
71. Regarding presidential authority under IEEPA, the report stated:
This grant of authorities does not include the following authorities which, under
section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, as amended by Title I of this bill,
are available to the President in time of declared war: (1)thepower to vest, i"e. to
take title toforeignproperty;(2) the power to regulate purely domestic transactions;
(3) the power to regulate gold or bullion; and (4) the power to seize records.
IEEPA Report, supra note 62, at 15 (emphasis supplied).

1982]

Iranian Settlement Agreements

broad powers over foreign assets in times of national emergency that he
previously possessed.7 2
Unlike the TWEA, the President's authority under the IEEPA has not
benefitted from extensive judicial interpretation. 73 However, because relevant sections of the TWEA were incorporated into the IEEPA, a review of
cases interpreting the TWEA is helpful.7 4
In 1940 and 1941, pursuant to section 5(b) of the TWEA, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued executive orders to prohibit certain transactions affecting property of foreign nationals, except when licensed by the
Secretary of the Treasury. 75 Several cases were filed challenging the President's actions under the TWEA and were decided by the Supreme Court.
In Propperv. Clark,7 6 President Roosevelt's executive order was applied
to Austria, thus preventing unlicensed transfers of Austrian property.77
The Court considered whether the freeze order barred a subsequent, unlicensed judicial transfer of an interest in property. While recognizing the
validity of the order, the Court limited its holding, stating: "We do not
now undertake to say whether every determination of rights concerning
blocked property in unlicensed litigation is voidable., 78 The Court hastened to add that the congressional purpose behind the TWEA favored
72. For example, presidential authority no longer includes the power to vest title to
property, or to regulate purely domestic transactions. The former is of direct relevance to
the holding in Dames & Moore, see infra notes 119-39 and accompanying text. The latter
prohibition was of concern in at least one district court case: see The Marschalk Co. v. Iran
Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (advertising services rendered solely
within the United States).
73. The lower courts litigating issues related to the Iranian settlement have, however,
addressed the President's authority under the IEEPA, as has the Supreme Court in Dames &
Moore. See infra notes 110-15 & 119-39 and accompanying text.
74. In addition, these cases were cited by the Court in Dames & Moore, see infra notes
127-39 and accompanying text. They are especially useful in isolating the factors important
in an analysis of presidential authority in this area.
75. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (1940); Exec. Order No. 8785, 6 Fed. Reg.
2897 (1941).
76. 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
77. This action, commonly referred to as a freeze order, is precisely what President
Carter did with regard to Iranian property within the jurisdiction of the United States
courts. See Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,279 (1979).
Under the TWEA, if the President chose to permanently transfer title to property previously frozen, he did so by means of a vesting order. Frequently this was done to satisfy
outstanding United States claims against the country whose property was frozen. In Dames
& Moore, it was contended that the President's actions constituted a vesting when he forced
the transfer of property, previously allowed to be attached, back to Iran. See infra notes
120-39 and accompanying text. It will be recalled that through the reform of the TWEA, the
IEEPA prohibited the President from vesting title to foreign property. See supra notes 62-74
and accompanying text.
78. Propper, 337 U.S. at 486.
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federal determination of the rights in blocked assets.79
The Court later decided two cases, both entitled Zillman v. McGrath,8 °
involving essentially the same facts. Americans holding claims, against
German banks obtained attachments on the debtor's accounts in a New
York state court. Previously, the President had ordered the German assets
frozen but did not specifically forbid the issuance of attachment orders
until after the attachments in these cases had been obtained.8 '
In Zittman 1, the government claimed that petitioners obtained no lien
or other interest in the attached accounts by virtue of the freeze order.
Refusing to give retroactive effect to the government's subsequent clarification of the freeze order, however, the Court validated the attachment orders. 8' The Court emphasized that an attachment was similar in effect to
the presidential freeze order8 3 and, therefore, consistent with the congressional purpose of the TWEA. Moreover, the Court noted that execution in
satisfaction of judgment was clearly prohibited, and thus the attachment
could never effect a transfer without first being authorized by the
President. 4
Subsequent to the freeze order, the government issued a vesting order
which required the turnover of the German property so that it could be
accounted for as provided by law. In Zittman I, the Court sustained the
government's request that the accounts be seized in order to be administered.8 5 In so holding, the Zit/man II Court highlighted the fact that the
government was making a request for the protection of American credi79. In this regard, Justice Reed stated:
The congressional purpose to put control of foreign assets in the hands of the President ... so that there might be a unified national policy in the administration of
the Act, argues strongly for federal determination of issues of rights in the blocked
assets. Comity does not require abnegation to the extent that a federal court cannot adjudicate rights to the claim involved.
Id at 493. Thus, Propper may be viewed, in part, as involving the supremacy of federal
legislation over state law, while leaving open any future determination of the effect of a
freeze order where facts and legal issues may differ.
80. 341 U.S. 446 (1951) (Zittman I); 341 U.S. 471 (1951) (Zittman II).
81. 341 U.S. 446, 452 (1951).
82. Id at 463.
83. In this regard, the Court stated:
[T]he effect of the State's action, like that of the federal, was to freeze these funds,
to prevent their withdrawal or transfer to use of the German nationals. There is no
suggestion that these attachment proceedings could in any manner benefit the enemy. The sole beniciaries are American citizens whose liens are not derived from
the enemy but are adverse to any enemy interests.
Id at 463 (emphasis supplied).
84. Id at 451.
85. 341 U.S. 471, 472-74 (1951).
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tors 6 and therefore furthering the purposes of the TWEA.
Two observations outline the significance of the divergent holdings in
both Zittman cases. First, Zittman II involved the effect of a vesting order,
whereas Zittman I was concerned with the impact on the attachments of a
freeze order under the TWEA. Second, the Court was committed to
render a decision that would further the purposes of the program to take
control of the assets. 7 Since petitioner's actions in Zittman I and the government's actions in Zittman I were consistent with those purposes, they
both obtained favorable judgments.
In 1953, the Supreme Court elaborated on the effect of presidential actions taken pursuant to the TWEA in Orvis v. Brownell."8 After President
Roosevelt's executive order was enforced against Japanese assets, petitioners obtained an unlicensed attachment in a New York court of a credit
owed to Japanese debtors. Thereafter, a vesting order was issued transferring title to the credit to the United States government. Petitioners filed
notice of their claim with the government, pursuant to section 9(a) of the
TWEA. s9 The Court was called upon to decide whether the freeze order
prevented a creditor from attaching an interest or right in property that
would support a claim against the government under section 9 of the Act
and held that the order had such an effect. 90 Pointing out the clarity of the
86. The Court said:
While the statute ... authorizes the vesting of such foreign-owned property in the
Custodian and its administration 'in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States,' it is not a confiscation measure, but a liquidation measure for the
protection of American creditors. It provides for the filing and proving of claims
and states that the funds 'shall be equitably applied' for the payment of debts.
Id at 473-74 (citations omitted).
87. The Court noted the purposes of the federal program:
1.Protecting property of persons in occupied countries; 2. Preventing the Axis, now
our enemy, from acquiring any benefit from these blocked assets; 3. Facilitating the
use of blocked assets in the United Nations war effort and protecting American
banks and business institutions; 4. ProtectingAmerican creditors; 5. Foreign relations, including post-war negotiations and settlements.
341 U.S. at 453-54 (emphasis supplied).
88. 345 U.S. 183 (1953).
89. Id. at 185. Section 9(a) of the TWEA provides for filing claims against property
transferred to the United States government and reads, in pertinent part:
Any person not an enemy or ally of an enemy claiming any interest, right, or title
in any money or other property which may have been conveyed, transferred, assigned, delivered, or paid to the ... [government] or seized ... may file with [the
government] a notice of his claims under oath . . . and the President . . . may
order the payment ... or delivery to said claimant of the money or other property.
50 U.S.C. app. § 9(a) (1976). This section also provides that if the President does not order
the payment, the claimant may bring an action in equity to establish a right to the property
and force payment. Id.
90. Orvr, 345 U.S. at 186.
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freeze order, the Court stated that petitioners were on notice that the creation of a lien on the property was prohibited. 9 Thus,92the attachment, as
obtained, was invalid against the federal government.
Judicial construction of the freeze power under the TWEA has endorsed
the President's broad authority to determine the disposition of frozen assets and, therefore, the viability of any underlying attachments. Today,
however, this power is not without limit. Principally, Congress intended to
redefine the President's power by enacting the IEEPA. Any insight derived from Propper, Orvis, and the Zittman cases is necessarily qualified by
this reform legislation. More importantly, the Supreme Court clearly intended to enforce the purposes of TWEA by providing for the protection
of American creditors in each case. Two further observations with regard
to these cases provide additional understanding of the context within
which these opinions were issued.
Less than one month after President Roosevelt issued the executive orders that spawned this litigation, Congress ratified the President's actions
by joint resolution.9 3 Thus, long before these cases reached the Supreme
Court, the President enjoyed legislative approval of the steps taken. 94 In
addition, Propper, Orvis, and the Zittman cases involved state court proceedings that conflicted with federal law, thus presenting a supremacy
clause problem. The Court particularly emphasized this factor in Orvis.9 5
In the context of the Iranian settlement agreements, the congressional
grant of substantive authority is somewhat obscure. Prior to the Agree91. Id at 186-87.
92. The Court stated:
But the question is not whether a lien, concededly valid because obtained prior to
the freezing order, may be 'annulled' by the [government], but rather whether the
freezing order prevented the subsequent acquisition, by attachment, of such a
property interest as the [government] would have to recognize under § 9 of the Act.
Because of the supremacy of the Federal Government on matters within its competence, the freezing order, while permitting an attachment for jurisdiction and other
state law purposes, prevented the subsequent acquisition of a lien which would
bind the [government] under § 9.
Id at 188. Like Propper and the Zitman cases, in Orrs the conflict was between state and
federal policy.
93. Pub. Res. No. 69, 54 Stat. 179 (1940).
94. The value of congressional approval is particularly relevant to the analysis of presidential power to affect the Iranian settlement agreements. In light of Youngstown, when the
President acts with the support of Congress, his power is at its maximum. See supra notes
52-54 and accompanying text. Although hearings were held involving the Iranian settlement agreements, Congress has taken no formal action.
95. The issue that developed as a result of the Iranian settlement agreements had no
connection with the supremacy clause of the Constitution. Dames & Moore concerned a
separation of powers conffict, a question never addressed by the Supreme Court in Propper,
Orpir, or the Ziuman cases.
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ments, the President's power to act pursuant to the IEEPA was largely
untested. In addition, the circumstances presented a separation of powers
problem that would tend to limit the applicability of prior case law interpreting the TWEA. The separation of powers conflict involved the role of
the judiciary in settling claims pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Whether directly intended to do so or not, this legislation was
another congressional attempt to clarify the President's power to settle foreign claims.
2. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
For nearly a century and a half, the United States recognized and applied the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.9 6 Under this doctrine,
foreign states were immune from suit and courts would adhere to suggestions of immunity offered by the executive branch on behalf of a defendant
foreign state. 97
In 1952, the United States informally adopted the so called restrictive
principle of sovereign immunity. 98 "[T]he immunity of a foreign state is
'restricted' to suits involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and
does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private acts (jure gestionis)." 9 9 Under the restrictive theory, however, the executive branch remained in control of sovereign immunity determinations by continuing to
suggest immunity to the courts. As a practical matter, the executive
branch did so when prompted by diplomatic pressure from the foreign
entity. oo
Problems with this approach continued. Execution against foreign
property was not permitted.' 0 ' In addition, the private litigant's high de96. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Branch) 116 (1812); H.R.
No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6606-07 [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Report will be hereinafter referred to as FSIA Report].
97. Cf.Ex Parre Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
98. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to the
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952).
99. FSIA Report, supra note 96, at 6605.
100. The FSIA Report stated:
From a foreign relations standpoint, the initiative is left to the foreign state. The
foreign state chooses which sovereign immunity determinations it will leave to the
courts, and which it will take to the State Department. The foreign state also decides when it will attempt to exert diplomatic influences, thereby making it more
difficult for the State Department to apply the Tate letter criteria.
Id at 6607.
101. Id at 6625-26.
REP.
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gree of uncertainty resulting from this approach °2 inspired congressional
action.
Enacted "to provide when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit
03
against a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the United States,"
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).was intended to solve these
problems.'" By virtue of its authority to regulate foreign commerce and
the jurisdiction of Article III courts, Congress extended the jurisdiction of
federal district courts to commercial lawsuits brought by United States
claimants against foreign states or an entity thereof.' 05
FSIA codifies the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and provides
for the liability of nonimmune foreign states.'1 6 The Act sets forth a
means to effect service of process on foreign states, guidelines for attachment in certain cases, and the right of United States claimants to execution
in satisfaction ofjudgment on the commercial property of foreign states.'0 7
The Act is designed to bar executive branch interference in commercial
lawsuits involving foreign states' 0 8 and, in so doing, it has enhanced the
judiciary's role in foreign claims settlement. Court decisions in this area
were to be unaffected by the political pressures of the executive branch.
Like the IEEPA, the FSIA was a congressional attempt to limit broad
presidential authority. The context of the Iranian settlement agreements
brought about the confluence of these acts. This area of presidential authority, however, is characterized by legislation and case law that is neither
definitive nor comprehensive.' 0 9 Youngstown remains valuable because of
the framework of analysis it provides. No other case law directly addresses separation of powers within the federal government to settle
102. The FSIA Report stated: "A private party who deals with a foreign government
entity cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be decided as the
basis of nonlegal considerations through the foreign government's intercession with the Department of State." Id at 6607.
103. Id at 6604.

104. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976).
105. Id § 1330.

106. Id § 1606.
107. Id §§ 1608-1611.

108. The FSIA Report stated:
A principle purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign
policy implications of immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these
often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process.
See supra note 96, at 6606.
109. Justice Jackson, in Youngstown, stated: [A] judge ... may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves." 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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claims. Although Congress has provided guidance in limited situations, its
legislation does not indicate complimentary authority within the executive
and judicial branches to effect claims settlement, and it appears that the
prospect that the two branches may conflict was unanticipated in the statutory enactments. In short, foreign claims settlement power is characterized
by a great chasm in the traditional guides a court would call upon to resolve the issues raised by the Iranian settlement agreements.
D.

United States Claims Against Iran in Lower Courts

Although it has been estimated that over 450 major United States
claims" had been filed in federal district courts against Iran or its entities,
only two cases were reviewed at the court of appeals level before the
Supreme Court decided the issues involved.
On May 22, 1981, the First Circuit decided Chas. T Main International,
Inc. v. Khuzestan Water & PowerAuthority." On the same day, the District of Columbia Circuit decided American InternationalGroup, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran."12 Notwithstanding the difference between the
facts of these cases,"' the courts framed the issues in a similar manner.
Both courts concluded that the President enjoyed specific congressional
authorization under the IEEPA to nullify prejudgment attachments and
order the transfer of assets back to Iran.' 4 In addition, they found that the
President had inherent authority to order the suspension of claims pending
in Article III courts."' The Supreme Court accorded great weight to the
analysis in these cases in Dames & Moore.
110. A major claim has been characterized as one in excess of $250,000. It is believed
that as many as 1700 minor claims, those less than $250,000 were filed. See The Iran Agreements, supra note 5, at 74 (statement of Lawrence Newman from the law firm of Baker &
McKenzie), 164 (statement of Larry L. Simms, Acting Attorney General, Dep't of Justice)
(1981).
111. 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981).
112. 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
113. In Main, the dispute arose out of the alleged failure by Iran to pay for services by
Main in connection with an Iranian electrification project. 651 F.2d at 802.
In AIG, a consolidation of two cases, Iran was sued for losses incurred as a result of the
nationalization of United States enterprises in Iran. 657 F.2d at 434.
In both cases, the claimants alleged that the President lacked the necessary authority to
issue the executive orders as a means of proving a claim for just compensation. 651 F.2d at
805; 657 F.2d at 437.
114. 651 F.2d at 808; 657 F.2d at 441.
115. 651 F.2d at 809-13; 657 F.2d at 441-45.
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ENDORSING THE PRESIDENT'S

BROAD DISCRETION

Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion was quick to highlight the dearth
of black letter law in this area of presidential authority.' 1 6 In addition, he
stressed that the Court was issuing a narrow holding." 7 However limited
the holding will be viewed outside of the context of the Iranian settlement
agreements, this case had direct application to several thousand claims
pending at the time of the decision.
Petitioner's contentions were threefold. In addition to arguing that the
President lacked authority to transfer the Iranian assets and to suspend the
pending United States claims, petitioner contended in the alternative that
the President's actions constituted a taking of property without just
compensation. " 8

.4. Nullification of PrejudgmentAttachments
In Dames & Moore, the government relied principally on section 1702 of

the IEEPA as authorization for the President's nullification of prejudgment attachments and subsequent transfer of assets back to Iran." 9 The
Court sustained the government's position, finding specific congressional
authorization for the President's actions in the IEEPA. 12 0 The nullification of prejudgment attachments and transfer of assets, therefore, manifested presidential power at its maximum.' 2 ' In support of this conclusion,
the Court made two further observations.
First, the conditional nature of the general license issued by President
Carter made the subsequent attachments obtained thereunder subordinate
to further actions by the President.' 2 2 The opinion posits that since the
license could be modified or revoked, any attachment issued would suffer
the same fate.' 23 In other words, the viability of the prejudgment attach116. The first section of Justice Rehnquist's opinion contains an overview that emphasized the continuing debate over this area of the law. 101 S. Ct. at 2977-78.
117. Justice Rehnquist stated: "We attempt to lay down no general 'guide-lines' covering other situations not involved here, and attempt to confine the opinion only to the very
questions necessary to the decision of the case." 101 S. Ct. at 2977.
118. Brief for Petitioner at 33, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
119. 101 S. Ct. at 2982.
120. Id at 2984.
121. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
122. 101 S. Ct. at 2983.
123. 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1981) states: "The provisions of this part and any rulings,
licenses, authorizations, instructions, orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended,

modified, or revoked at any time."
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ments was to be determined at the discretion of the executive branch., 24
This argument is initially suspect because neither the Court nor the government cited any controlling authority for the proposition. 2 5 In addition,
to prevent
it was arguably the intent of Congress, by enacting the FSIA,
26
settlement.
claims
judicial
in
interference
branch
executive
The Court's second observation in support of its holding was that the
congressional purpose in authorizing blocking orders was "to put control
of foreign assets in the hands of the President."' 2 7 The case that supports
this view, Propper v. Clark, interpreted the authorization under section
5(b) of the TWEA. 12 ' Notwithstanding express congressional approval of
the President's actions in that case, Congress modified the President's authority by enacting the IEEPA. The Court's holding, therefore, necessarily
turns on its interpretation of the President's power under the IEEPA.
Dames & Moore contended that the legislative history of the IEEPA
indicated that Congress did not intend the President to have the extensive
power he exercised in the Iranian settlement. 129 Arguing that the vesting
of title to the Iranian property was contrary to the congressional intent of
the Act, petitioner contended that the President could do no more than
freeze the assets or discontinue controls. 130 The Court rejected this interpretation, stating:
Nothing in the legislative history of either [section] 1702 or [section] 5(b) of the TWEA requires such a result. To the contrary,
we think both the legislative history and cases interpreting the
TWEA fully sustain the broad authority of the Executive when
acting under this congressional grant of power.' 3
Conceding, however, that the President has no authority to vest title to
foreign assets under the IEEPA, Justice Rehnquist concluded that from
"the plain language of the statute," the President was authorized to "other124. Indeed, the Court refers to the frozen assets as a "bargaining chip" of the President.
101 S. Ct. at 2984.
125. As noted previously, Propper, Orvis and the Zitman cases dealt with attachments

that were initially invalid because they were obtained without a license. In Dames &Moore,
the attachments were validly obtained. The precise issue, therefore, was what the quality of
each of the many attachments was after the issuance of the executive orders. Recognizing
that many of the over 2000 claims may have varying facts, Justice Powell dissented from this
portion of the opinion. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2984 (citing 337 U.S. 472, 493 (1949)).

128. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
129. See Brief for Petitioner at 23-33, Dames &Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
130. Id
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2983. The Court cited Orvis v- Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) as supporting authority.
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132
wise permanently dispose of the assets in the manner done here."'
The opinion does not explain how the President's actions did not constitute a vesting. No attempt was made to define the phrase "otherwise permanently dispose" nor the circumstances that gave rise to such authority.
of the
The Court's position can only be supported by a literal reading
33
wording.'
this
regarding
holdings
previous
to
IEEPA, contrary
The Court's position is defective for two additional reasons. First, the
President may have the requisite authority under TWEA, but only in wartime. Second, Congress expressly authorized the presidential actions that
fostered the Orvis case, as it had in Propper v. Clark.1 34 In these cases, as
in the Zittman cases, the Supreme Court upheld the purposes of the
creditors.135 ArguaTWEA and provided for the protection of American
136
bly, this was not the outcome in Dames & Moore.
Moreover, as Justice Powell pointed out, 137 the Court rejected the view
that the act of nullifying attachments may give rise to claims for just compensation. 138 Recognizing that the facts of several hundred lower court
cases may differ, Justice Powell dissented from this portion of the opinion
because he felt that "taking" questions should be resolved on a case-bycase basis. 139

132. Id at 2983 n.5.
133. In several cases, the Supreme Court has disregarded a literal application of the
TWEA's terms because they were inconsistent with legislative intent. For example, in Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952), the Court warned:
The concern of the Trading With the Enemy Act is with problems at once complicated and far-reaching in their repercussions. Instead of a carefully matured
enactment, the legislation was a makeshift patchwork. Such legislation strongly
counsels against literalness of application. It favors a wise latitude of construction
in enforcing its purposes.
342 U.S. at 319.
134. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
136. The benefit to private litigants of having claims subordinated to the Claims Tribunal remains in debate. In the absence of attachments of Iranian property in this country, the
Claims Tribunal is, of course, appealing, but the new forum may have many more disadvantages than a comparable district court. See supra note 5.
137. Dames & Moore, 101 S. Ct. at 2992 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
138. Id
139. Justice Powell may have made the most practical argument of all. Recognizing that,
simply because of the sheer number of claims involved, the Court may not have all the facts
before it, his position was to preserve the right to bring a "taking" claim against the United
States for the lost attachments. The Court, however, preserved this right only with regard to
the suspension of litigation. Id There are claims that do not fit the facts of the Dames &
Moore holding which the Court did not address, but which may nevertheless be bound by it.
See, e.g., Electronic Data Syst. Corp. Iran v. Social Security Org. of Iran, 508 F. Supp 1350
(N.D. Texas 1981) (attachments obtained prior to the freeze order not subject to the Treasury Regulations regarding nullification), and Marschalk Co. v. Iran Nat'l Airlines Corp., 518
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B. Suspension of Pending United States Court Claims
As with the nullification of attachments, the government relied on the
President's authority under the IEEPA to support the proposition that the
suspension of pending United States claims enjoyed express congressional
authorization. 4 ' The Court acknowledged, however, that such claims
have a separate existence from the attachments that accompanied them. 141
As such, the claims could not be considered transactions involving Iranian
property or representing an interest in such property until reduced to a
judgment. The Court concluded, therefore, that no such express congressional authorization for the President's actions existed under the
IEEPA.'

42

Under the Youngstown analysis, the President's power was not at its
maximum when he suspended the claims,' 43 but the Court sustained the
President's actions. Justice Rehnquist examined closely related legislation
and concluded that Congress had acquiesed to the President's exercise of
such broad discretion. It was exercised, according to Justice Jackson's own
words, in a zone of twilight.' 4 Therefore, the President's power was considered concurrent with that of Congress.
Dames & Moore argued that Congress, in passing the FSIA, intended to
divest the President of authority to settle claims and that the President's
actions were contrary to the congressional intent to depoliticize legal proceedings in Article III courts involving foreign claims.' 45 Thus, Dames &
Moore asserted, these actions were incompatible with the will of Congress
and represented presidential power at its lowest ebb.' 46 To constitute an
express violation of the FSIA, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that
the President circumscribed the jurisdiction of Article III courts by his actions. Although petitioner's argument was convincing in this regard, the
Court failed to accept its position.
Justice Rehnquist's response to this argument forms the crux of the
Court's holding on this issue. He posited that the President did not modify
F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (purely domestic transactions not within the power of the President under the IEEPA).

140. 101 S. Ct. at 2984. The Government also relied on the Hostage Act to buttress this
argument, since this act is included in the executive orders issued by Presidents Reagan and
Carter as authority for their actions. See supra note 9.
141. 101 S. Ct. at 2984.
142. Id. at 2984-85. In addition, the Court found no express congressional authorization
in any other legislation, including the Hostage Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976).
143. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
144. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 637.
145. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
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federal court jurisdiction, but only directed the courts to apply a different
rule of law.' 47 Because the executive orders only purported to suspend
United States claims, "those claims not within the jurisdiction of the
Claims Tribunal [would] 'revive' and become judicially enforceable in
United States courts."' 48 As authority for this proposition, Justice Rehnquist cited UnitedStates v. Schooner Peggy, 14 9 but those facts are clearly
distinquishable from Dames & Moore.
Schooner Peggy involved treaties entered into by the President and ratified by the United States Senate. As counsel for Dames & Moore pointed
out, Schooner Peggy indicated that a treaty may amend substantive law,
but it does not necessarily follow that the President may unilaterally
change substantive law by executive agreement.' 50 The Court's review of
other legislation and case law was also unconvincing in this regard.
Claims settlement by executive action has been, in some cases, inevitable. '5 ' The precise issue here, therefore, is what effect a presidential action
should have in the face of a pending federal court claim brought pursuant
to the FSIA. At the heart of this question is the separation of powers
52
within the federal government.'
The Court's review of closely related legislation, however, lends little
insight into how the foreign claims settlement power has been defined in
this regard. Through examination of the Hostage Act, the International
Claims Settlement Act, the IEEPA, and the FSIA, the only conclusion
53
drawn is that the President has the power to affect claims settlement.
The implication that this power entitles the President to override judicial
claims settlements is literally unsupported.' 54 Perhaps most importantly,
the two most recent congressional enactments touching on the President's
power in this area, the IEEPA and the FSIA, indicate Congress' intent to
147. 101 S. Ct. at 2989.
148. Id
149. 5 U.S. 103 (1801).
150. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).
151. In many cases, claims settlement by the President has been the only means of satisfying outstanding United States claims. This was the case prior to the enactment of the
FSIA, for without the many protections provided by the Act, claims settlement by a private
litigant was more difficult. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
152. The Court recognized the separation of powers conffict, 101 S. Ct. at 2977-78, but
seemed to ignore the problem of accomodating the confficting roles of the President and the
judiciary.
153. Express authority for the President's actions is not found in the plain language of
these statutes, nor has the subordination of judicial claims pursuant to these acts been a
practice in the past.
154. Of course, some of the lower court cases generated by the Iranian settlement agreements are in accord with the Supreme Court. See, e.g., supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
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155
limit, not expand, the President's authority.

C. The "Taking" Claims Against the United States
The two agreements with Iran clearly express the United States' obligation to terminate all legal proceedings against Iran. 156 The executive order
issued by President Reagan, however, purported only to suspend this litigation. 7 The Court, therefore, held that the "taking" issue was not ripe for
review because the claims litigation might be revived if the Claims Tribunal found it did not have jurisdiction over the matter. 5 8 Nevertheless, the
Court stated that if the issue became justiciable, claimants would5 9have a
right of action against the United States in the Court of Claims.'
The Court's opinion on this issue may have overlooked the most fundamental conflict in the Iranian ordeal. If the litigation were revived, logic
would support any Iranian contention that the United States breached the
agreements. Iran's reaction would likely include terminating the funding
of the Claims Tribunal escrow account.' 60 American claim holders would
then be faced with potentially unenforceable judgments resulting from the
revived litigation in United States courts because of the absence of Iranian
property in this country. In addition, those unsatisfied judgments of the
Claims Tribunal may lead to some form of recourse against the United
States government.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It cannot be denied that the Iranian settlement agreements manifest the
culmination of a unique situation. This may best explain the Supreme
Court's analysis in Dames & Moore. Little accord was given to the history,
either legislative or otherwise, regarding the nullification of attachments.
Yet, favorable historical presupposition was the mainstay of the argument
that the President had authority to suspend pending federal litigation.
Dames & Moore indicates the Supreme Court's intent to leave the definition of presidential authority in its traditionally obscure state, to be clarified only to fit the imperatives of the moment.
In failing to delineate boundaries for the President's authority in this
155. See supra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
157. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
158. 101 S. Ct. at 2991-92.
159. Id
160. The fear that Iran may not honor its commitment to fund the Claims Tribunal is
shared by many of those who participated in the congressional hearings on the Iranian settlement agreements. See The Iran Agreements, supra note 5, at 73.
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area, the Court's holding provides little insight into the future use of claims
settlement either by the executive or by the judiciary. In light of the increasing interaction among nations, this can only mean further uncertainty
for the private litigant.
Anthony J. Colucc4 III

